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Poets tell us that the locus of value judgments is the 
heart. Cognitive scientists have told us that it is the 
brain. I am here to tell you that it is the stomach. Upton 
Sinclair learned this when he wrote The Jungle, intended 
to expose the appalling conditions under which recent 
immigrants to the United States were forced to live. In­
stead, his discussion of slaughter and packing houses in 
the Midwest spawned the public outcry that initiated 
our current laws on food safety and quality. The Ameri­
can public’s ability to translate a broad range of social 
and ethical issues into food consumption issues is truly 
amazing. Criticisms of bovine somatotropin’s impact 
upon economies of scale in dairy production have been 
translated into concerns about the safety of milk, and 
animal rightists’ protests against production methods 
for veal calves have been translated into concerns about 
the human health effects of eating the meat (Browne, 
1987, Burton and McBride, 1989).
The most important ethical value associated with 
food safety and nutritional quality is human health. 
Ethical controversies associated with food safety and 
quality have evolved around the question of when to al­
low substances into the food chain, and at what levels. 
The controversy over recombinant bovine somatotro­
pin (BST) appears to raise the same question. The val­
ues and decision rules that are applied to the regulation 
of additives and residues are extremely diverse, and they 
are not mutually consistent (Halloran, 1986). Part of 
the diversity and inconsistency arises from competing 
accounts of health itself (Sagoff, 1985) but this compo­
nent of the food safety debate will not be discussed
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here. There is a pattern of argument in food safety debates that is wide­
spread across policy issues in which scientific evidence is expected to be de­
cisive. The first element of the pattern is criticism of the data, conclusions, 
or methods that have been used in assembling the scientific evidence. The 
second element is an inference to the effect that uncertainty in data, con­
clusions or methods entails risk to members of the public. The final ele­
ment is an attack upon the motives or values of scientists themselves, who 
are portrayed as trying to conceal risks and uncertainties from public view 
(Thompson, 1986).
The public discussion of foods, food additives, and chemical residues 
produced using techniques of recombinant DNA transfer has yet to move 
through each phase of this pattern. Nevertheless, the appearance of news­
paper articles raising questions about the human health implications of 
BST would appear to justify the fear that technical solutions to the mea­
surement of human health risk from the products of biotechnology will 
not resolve the public controversy. If controversial biotechnologies follow 
the pattern of energy and chemical technologies, ethical values will be in­
terwoven with statements and attitudes about the nature of risk, and with 
beliefs about evidence and behavior influence risk. Controversy and mis- 
communication arise to a considerable degree from the public's inability or 
unwillingness to understand and accept the technical definitions of risk 
used by the scientific community. This paper will first examine some of 
the breadth and vagueness in common applications of the word “risk'', then 
will discuss three types of ethical issue that emerge readily from the com­
mon grammar of risk, but not from accepted technical concepts.
Qualitative and Conceptual Elements of Risk
Scientific research techniques are well suited to the 
measurement of certain key relationships between 
exposure to a given substance and the subsequent oc­
currence of harm. These relationships are important 
in food safety because high correlations between ex­
posure and harm give cause for concern about the hu­
man health effects of exposure to the substance. 
Though important, the measurable relationships between exposure and 
harm are misleading policy indicators when they are taken to define risk to 
the exclusion of qualitative characteristics. One often hears the opinion 
that scientists study the reality of risk (Starr, et ai, 1976; Ruckleshaus, 
1983). People who are concerned with other factors relevant to risk are
“Risk" is a common 
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dealing with mere perception; only the scientists deal with reality. This 
view of risk is logically insupportable (Thompson, 1990) but what is im­
portant here is that it conceals a normative judgment to emphasize the 
measurable correlations between exposure and harm behind the language 
of perception and reality. Risk and reality are both politically potent no­
tions. The judgement to emphasize measurable relationships is often justi­
fied; taking these relationships to model the reality of risk is not.
“Risk” is a common English word. It cannot be appropriated as a techni­
cal term without inviting miscommunication. Careful listening to the way 
that the word “risk" functions in ordinary speech reveals a varied pattern 
of use. One variation of particular importance concerns a tendency to use 
the word risk both as a classifier for acts and as a descriptor of future 
events. Risk is both a verb and a noun. As a verb, it denotes something that 
people do. The most common formulations imply intentionality, that is, 
that when people risk, they do so on purpose (through intentional acts of 
risk can have unintended consequences). When people run risks they have 
not consciously taken, the tendency is to shift the word “risk” to its nomi­
native form. Even as a noun, however, risk is ambiguous between its act- 
classifying and its event-describing meanings. As a classifier of actions, the 
noun “risk” names those actions that might have been described using the 
verb form, as in “She risked her life unknowingly by smoking cigarettes.” 
Note that although this act-classifying use of the word does not always 
imply that a person has knowingly chosen to risk, it does imply that the 
act in question is an intentional one. We would not, for example, describe 
an epileptic seizure as “risking one’s life," despite the clear indication that 
there is a significant probability of harm associated with seizures. The rea­
son is that enduring a seizure is not an intentional act. This grammatical 
pattern allows us to say that, in one sense, enduring a seizure is not a risk, 
because the seizure is not an intentional act. Calling the seizure a risk in 
this sense would be a category mistake. The grammar of risk allows “Why 
do you risk your life by having a cigarette?" but not “Why do you risk your 
life by having a seizure?”.
It is clear, however, that the word “risk” is also used to describe a trait of 
future events, e.g. that if they occurred they might be harmful. We talk 
about the risk of an earthquake or a flood, and sometimes even ordinary 
people say that floods and earthquakes are risks, (though in my experience 
this form of speech is far more common among risk analysts and scien­
tists). If the word risk is used to describe this trait of events, or if it is used 
to refer to events having this trait to a strong degree, different grammatical
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rules come into play. Since situations such as enduring a seizure are signifi­
cantly correlated with some probability of harm, they would be clear cases 
of risk. Indeed, there appear to be no situations that do not involve some 
degree of risk, at least when it is the event-describing sense of risk that we 
have in mind. As such, when grammatical rules for act-classifying are ap­
plied, an epileptic seizure is not a risk, but when rules for event-describing 
are applied, it is.
The philosophical grammar that distinguishes these two senses of risk 
is admittedly subtle (Thompson, 1987a). An epileptic seizure is a risk to 
one’s life, but to have a seizure is not to risk one’s life. Simply inverting the 
word order entails the semantic change. The differences between act-clas­
sifying and event-describing uses of risk are not sharp enough to warrant 
the claim that there are two, fully distinct meanings. Nevertheless, the dif­
ferent uses of the word “risk’’ suggest opportunities for technical or formal 
specifications of the term risk that stress event-describing grammar to the 
exclusion of act-classifying grammar (or vice versa).
The expected value analysis of risk, for example, defines risk as a func­
tion of the probability and value (utility) of future events (Friedman and 
Savage, 1948). Expected values are themselves computed as a function of 
value or utility associated with the event and the probability of the event’s 
occurrence. There are several ways of representing risk as an expected val­
ue. One simple and intuitive function is for all. This concept of risk can be 
linked to decision-making through the expected utility theory of choice. 
Although there are several decision rules that can be applied to convert ex­
pected utility calculations into action (Rescher, 1983), the simplest one as­
sumes that the objective of decision making is to select the option with op­
timal expected utility. The option with the highest net expected utility, 
once costs and benefits are weighed, is the one that should be chosen.
The expected value analysis of risk places a great deal of emphasis upon 
quantifiable probabilities, plus it is easily linked to a theory of choice.
These two factors make it very attractive as a conceptual approach for sci­
ence-based public policy (Kneese et al., 1983; Freeman and Portney, 1989). 
The expected value analysis of risk also provides a rigorous and sophisticat­
ed development of the event-describing applications of risk that we note 
in ordinary language. The rigor in the expected value analysis, however, is 
achieved at the expense of act-classifying shades of meaning that can be 
detected in the ordinary concept of risk. I suggested above that correlations 
between exposure and harm are extremely important in setting policy for 
food safety and quality, but that they do not exhaust the ethically signifi-
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cant aspects of risk policy. 1 shall, in the next three sections of this paper, 
offer some examples of ethically significant issues that are conceptually 
linked to the act-classifying grammar of risk.
Human Action, Risk, and Responsibility
As noted above, the expected value analysis of risk applies equally well to 
intentional actions and natural events. One can quantify the fatality risk 
of driving drunk, of undergoing a seizure, or of being caught in an earth­
quake. Simple comparison of the expected values makes these events ap­
pear morally commensurate, but they are not. We hold people responsible 
for their action when they drive drunk, but we do not hold people respon- 
208 sible for the consequences of enduring a seizure or an earthquake. The ex­
pected value analysis of risk provides no clue as to whether an agent would 
be held responsible for their actions, or correlatively, as to whether it 
would be responsible to act in a prescribed way.
We do not classify the seizure or the earthquake as acts, but drunk driv­
ing is an act. The act-classifying rules of grammar for risk are part of a tax­
onomy for sorting different kinds of action. Some actions are considered 
risks, others are not. The criteria for sorting seem to involve paradigm cas­
es or ideal type classifications, so that judgments as to whether an act is a 
risk can be drawn by analogy. In our society, driving while drunk is para­
digmatic case of risk; driving while sober is not. It also seems that tradi­
tional familiarity with the act in question is a criterion. Using the new fan- 
gled convection oven is a risk; boiling peas on the stove is not. Here, calling 
an action a risk is one way of noting that a person will be held responsible 
for the consequences. It is a way of urging caution, rather than a claim that 
significant probabilities of harm exist or have been measured.
An idealized depiction of traditional tort law provides the clearest ac­
count of how classifying actions under the category of risk plays a role in 
making decisions and in assessing responsibility. Innovations in the case 
law of torts during the past two decades have introduced the expected val­
ue analysis into liability decisions (Schroeder, 1986), so the following por­
trayal of torts should not be taken as a description of current practice. Tra­
ditional torts are based on common law. The purpose is to assess whether 
the claimant bringing suit was wrongfully harmed by the defendant, and 
whether the defendant should be required to pay damages. The claimant 
may meet his burden of proof by showing that the actions of the accused 
were risks, then that they actually resulted in harm to the claimant. Simple 
demonstration of harm is not enough to warrant damage in traditional
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torts, for the defendant's act is judged to be a risk only when it is some­
thing that a reasonable person would not do. If the act would have been re­
garded as unexceptional and proper by a reasonable person, the claimant 
cannot meet the initial burden of proof. The principle implies a general rec­
ognition that harm can occur as a result of happenstance, freak events or 
so-called acts of God, even when the actions of a defendant are completely 
ordinary acts of the sort that reasonable people perform everyday. Even 
when the claimant meets the dual burden of proof, the defendant has an 
opportunity to demonstrate exculpatory factors, and the list of potential 
exculpatory factors is extensive. They include, for example, whether the 
defendant acted knowingly and whether the claimant had complicity in 
undertaking the risky course of action.
The key concept in proving both the initial claim of risk and in provid­
ing excuses is that of the reasonable person. In the traditional process of es­
tablishing responsibility, there is a large class of actions that are not risks, 
simply because they are so broadly accepted, even though there are measur­
able (and perhaps even relatively high) numerical probabilities that they 
might result in harm. As is generally the practice in common law, criteria 
for deciding what is a risk and what is not are established by drawing anal­
ogies to precedents. These criteria are set forth in judicial opinions and be­
come more deeply embedded into law the longer they endure, and the more 
broadly they are applied (see Thomson, 1986 for a general discussion of risk 
in tort law). Laws regulating food safety are statutory and administrative, 
so the traditional practice of torts may be a poor model. The point is not to 
advocate reliance upon traditional case law, but to show how this idealiza­
tion of torts draws upon the act classifying grammar of risk in making a de­
termination of responsibility.
From a policy standpoint, the principal advantages of stressing the act 
classifying sense of risk arise from its power to link harm with actions for 
which persons could be held legally or morally responsible. The expected 
value analysis, by contrast, stresses the sense in which every instance of 
harm falls into statistical patterns. Since individual persons or corporate 
groups are clearly not responsible for the statistical pattern, this can make 
it seem as if they should not be held responsible for the harm that does ma­
terialize as a result of their actions.
Equivocation Problems and False Authority
Equivocation upon distinct meanings of the same term is one of the most 
egregious and indisputably fallacious forms of logical error. Although
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equivocation fallacies are conspicuous when exposed, their obviousness 
does not preclude their occurrence. Equivocation has ethical implications 
when it is the source of error in judgment, or in communication. Equivoca­
tion can also play a role in the creation of false authority, as when a judg­
ment justifiable on one interpretation of the term is imposed upon a situa­
tion in which the alternative interpretation would be more appropriate. 
More serious ethical issues arise when equivocation is used as a deliberate 
vehicle of deception.
Although simple errors of judgment and intentional deceptions occur in 
the discussion of food safety literature, false authority may be the most 
important ethical issue associated with equivocation on the act-classifying 
and the event-describing meanings of risk. Most people apply the concept 
of risk in ordinary decision making without being fully aware of the se­
mantic content or logical structure of either act-classifying or event-de- 
scribing usage. The context of speech is usually sufficient to specify the 
meaning intended in any given speaker's utterance. If the application of 
risk concepts implied in each usage were to be specified rigidly, as in the ex­
pected value analysis of risk, the result would be two incompatible con­
cepts of risk. The problem of false authority arises when the expected value 
analysis of risk is applied in such a way as to make otherwise reasonable 
judgments appear illogical, uninformed, and even irrational.
One instance of the false authority fallacy occurs 
when actions for which individual or corporate 
agents can be held responsible are compared to 
natural events in order to derive standards for ac­
ceptable risk (Starr, 1969). Many naturally occur­
ring substances are estimated to possess greater 
carcinogenicity than heavily banned additives and 
heavily regulated chemical residues (Ames 1983). 
What should we make of this fact? The expected 
value analysis of risk can be interpreted to imply 
that there are certain trade-offs between risk and 
benefit that are acceptable, without regard to the 
origin of the risks. The preceding discussion of responsibility shows that 
origins are sometimes important. Although it is clear that the dangers of 
natural carcinogens have been tolerated or endured by human populations, 
the expected value analysis of risk begs the question of why we should tol­
erate or endure similar levels of expected harm from human action 
(Thompson, 1987b).
Acceptability, in other 
words, implies an 
intentional attitude 
toward the act, not mere 
tolerance on passively 
enduring a state of 
affairs.. .It may indeed 
be a foolish waste of 
public resources to 
ensure against harms 
that are already far less 
likely to occur than 
harmful natural events.
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When responsibility is important, the permissibility of risk is deter­
mined by comparing the act to the standard range of things that human 
beings do, by considering the importance of the ends sought, and by exam­
ining the alternative ways of achieving the end. In this context, the judg­
ment that a risk is acceptable implies that there are overriding moral or 
prudential reasons for acting in an exceptional manner. Acceptability, in 
other words, implies an intentional attitude toward the act, not mere tol­
erance on passively enduring a state of affairs. There is a genuine philoso­
phical issue here. It may indeed be a foolish waste of public resources to en­
sure against harms that are already far less likely to occur than harmful 
natural events. The important philosophical issue is not illuminated, how­
ever, when the expected value analysis is falsely applied to cases where hu­
man agency and responsibility for risk are clearly important.
There may also be elements of equivocation in the so-called “zero risk” 
debate. When the concept of risk implies a classification of actions, the 
main point is to use case analogies and the vague notion of a reasonable 
person to classify an act as risky or non-risky. As noted above, some situa­
tions get classified as “no risk” for reasons that have nothing to do with 
probability, but everything to do with the grammatical rules for act classi­
fication. The rules for a “no risk” classification depend upon analogies to 
unexceptional, ordinary things that any reasonable person might do, as 
well as to whether the event in question is an intentional act. It is possible, 
for example, to adopt an act-classifying standard of zero tolerance for risk. 
The standard prohibits any intentional action that risks health and safety 
of others. This standard does not imply, however, that there is zero proba­
bility of harm for the category of risk may exclude both traditional practic­
es and natural events. Under an expected value interpretation, risk can be 
zero only when the probability of an event is zero; but it is impossible to 
reach absolute zero probability using standard statistical techniques. At 
face value, the Delaney Clause appears to be a zero tolerance statute, and 
the “generally regarded as safe” (GRAS) list would appear to reflect the rea­
sonable person’s judgment of what is and is not a risk. The regulatory in­
terpretation of the Delaney Clause has come to be understood as requiring 
zero probability of harm, however. If one applies an expected value criteri­
on to the act-classifying standard of zero tolerance, the standard becomes 
absurd (NRC, 1987). Any situation can be statistically correlated to harm­
ful events! How the Delaney Clause should be interpreted is a serious 
philosophical issue, but the serious issue is concealed by the law’s apparent 
absurdity, given an expected value analysis of risk.
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The problem of false authority relates to the role of science in the policy 
making process. There are always good scientific reasons for adopting the 
expected value analysis of risk, and there are sometimes good policy rea­
sons too. When the expected value analysis comes to exclude the multiple 
shades of meaning that are associated with risk in common speech, howev­
er, some of the most natural ways of raising serious issues about responsi­
bility for action appear absurd. People who are applying the grammar of 
risk in very standard and traditional ways appear to be making logically in­
supportable statements, and the ethical issues that would be raised by 
these standard and traditional ways of talking about risk appear chimerical 
and irrational. The danger is that the appearance of irrationality will be 
dealt with by handing policy over to experts; only in this case, the criterion 
for being an expert lies primarily in possessing an impoverished under­
standing of risk.
Optimizing Versus Informed Consent
So far, the main implications of noting the act-classifying sense of risk 
have been rhetorical. One should be careful not use the word risk in ways 
which preclude or diminish the validity of responsibility issues, and one 
should be careful not to imply false authority by equivocating on act classi­
fying and event describing senses of the word. The last set of implications 
are more substantial, and less easily resolvable. The expected value analysis 
of risk fits neatly with a general philosophical commitment to the view 
that policy should be evaluated according to whether it makes an optimal 
use of public resources in providing benefits to citizens. This broadly utili­
tarian view of public policy has long been challenged by opponents who 
stress consent of the governed. The opponents of utilitarianism hold that 
government action is legitimate when it is the result of procedures de­
signed to secure or reflect the consent of all who are affected. In many 
cases these two principles will coincide, but there are no logical entailment 
relations between them, and there are important issues on which they fail 
to coincide.
The contrast between optimizing and informed consent is particularly 
relevant for evaluating questions of risk (MacLean, 1986). Within the area 
of human health risks, we find a stark contrast between risk policies that 
seek efficient or optimal levels of public exposure to risk, and those that 
stress informed consent. Both strategies for assessing and accepting risk 
are enormously complex in their details. Optimizing, as I use the term 
here, includes any strategy that applies a threshold or benefit-risk decision
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rule to a measured risk, though the application of alternative decision rules 
can result in very different risk decisions. Regulatory policies administered 
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are a clear example of the 
optimizing strategy. Consent policies can delegate decisions that might 
have been made by public agencies to the private sector, and this strategy 
can make it appear that there is no risk policy in place, at all. For example, 
our policy of allowing choices on accepting the risks of specific disease 
therapies to be made on the basis of individual doctor-patient relation­
ships is an application of informed consent. The principle of informed con­
sent places the greatest burden of proof upon parties who are active. In 
standard health care relationships, the active parties are the physician and 
the patient. If government were to become active in this policy arena, it, 
too, would have to meet a test of informed consent.
The main point here is to see how the philosophical conflict between 
optimizing and informed consent occurs in controversies over food and 
health policy. The continuing controversy over whether and what public 
health recommendations should be made regarding dietary cholesterol has 
an element of this conflict. Public health scientists want strong dietary 
recommendations, for they think that dietary changes will save lives. 
Others have opposed general dietary recommendations on the ground 
that, since some (perhaps many) individuals do not need to follow the rec­
ommendations, they are deprived of their right to informed choice when 
given misleading information by public health authorities (Levine, 1986; 
Kunkel and Thompson, 1988).
The politics of the FDA’s attempt to ban substances such as DES or sac­
charin have also became entangled in the optimizing/informed consent 
dispute, with neither the optimizers (Rodricks, 1986; Schultz, 1986) nor 
the advocates of consent (Turner, 1986; Whelan and Havender, 1986), hap­
py with the result. Citing the DES case extensively, Deborah Johnson 
(1986) has marshalled some of the principal arguments against consent, at 
least for food safety and quality. She notes that principles of informed con­
sent presume that food consumers are competent judges of food safety 
and quality, that they have and can interpret all of the relevant informa­
tion, and that they are not coerced into making one food choice rather 
than another. Johnson contends that all of these conditions are, to some 
degree, unfulfilled. As such, she argues, we are forced to develop decision 
rules for acceptable risk, though she cautions against a too simplistic ap­
plication of benefit-risk analysis.
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Taking the side of consent, Henry Shue (1986) rejects optimizing policy 
criteria and risk/benefit analysis in particular. Shue thinks that risk policy 
should be understood as part of governments general responsibility to pro­
tect individuals from harm by others. Optimizing strategies tend to con­
ceal the link between risk and harm. He writes that optimizing policies are 
“.. ,non-starter[s] because ... the numbers of people count, while in mat­
ters of rights, the numbers do not ordinarily count. On the contrary, one of 
the central purposes of rights is to protect the vulnerable, even if they are a 
small minority.” (p. 195) It is only when people have clearly chosen to ac­
cept risks that they can be understood to be acceptable.
Informed consent is only loosely related to the act classifying sense of 
risk, for it is clearly possible to raise questions about consent when risk is 
understood purely as the probability of harm. There is a tendency, howev­
er, for optimizers to gravitate toward the expected value analysis as a way 
to compare risk with other forms of cost and benefit. Similarly, there may 
be a greater tendency for questions of informed 
consent to arise when risk is more transparently 
taken to be a form of action. One way to discharge 
one’s responsibility in taking risks is to ensure that 
all parties who are affected have agreed to hold the 
agent blameless.
Risk is not a real entity 
or relation that yields its 
secrets to objective 
scientific analysis.
Conclusions
My main objective in this paper has been to facilitate food safety debates 
by pointing out some key sources of miscommunication. Risk is not a real 
entity or relation that yields its secrets to objective scientific analysis. 
There are philosophical choices to make about whether to regard risk as 
primarily a taxonomic concept, for which probability considerations are 
secondary, or to regard risk as a purely statistical concept. Committing 
oneself wholly to either option has moral and policy implications that are 
of tremendous significance.
I would not suggest that insupportable food safety judgments, the public 
concerns about BST, for example, are any sense justified by the ethical val­
ues implied in emphasizing action. They are still silly concerns. Under­
standing risk as a type of action, rather than as a probability of harm, does 
indicate a thread of rationality, however. The raising of non-food related 
concerns about BST may have made the introduction of this technology 
seem less standard and unexceptional than it might have been. Having 
been categorized as a risk to the economic well being of dairy farmers, it is
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It Is scientists who 
will have to demon­
strate Insight and 
sensitivity to the non 
quantitative factors 
that inform policy 
decisions on risk.
subjected to much more rigorous conceptual tests 
than it might otherwise have been. One of these tests 
is avoidability, whether there is a reasonable alterna­
tive. In the case of milk production, there surely is.
There are still some logical fallacies in the chain of 
reasoning that I have just described, but they are cer­
tainly less egregious than simply leaping from the 
claim that BST may harm the interests of some small farmers to the claim 
that milk produced with the technology is hazardous to drink. We will, I 
think, get farther with people who commit such fallacies if we can under­
stand how a reasonable person could arrive at such conclusions than we 
will by accusing them of emotionalism, fear and irrationality. It is not, 
however, philosophers who will be called upon to communicate with the 
public about such risk questions. It is scientists who will have to expose 
the fallacies with gentleness and tact. It is scientists who will have to dem­
onstrate insight and sensitivity to the non-quantitative factors that in­
form policy decisions on risk. Rigid adherence to an expected utility analy­
sis of risk will make the scientist's task far more difficult, at least, and may 
preclude their completing it altogether.
Finally, scientific evidence will not always be the appropriate basis for 
risk decisions. Sometimes it may be possible and better simply to let people 
choose the risks they want to take, without even collecting the scientific 
evidence correlating exposure and harm. Sometimes it may even be better 
to allow responsibility for risk exposure to be determined in the courts. We 
currently make huge financial investments in risk assessment, and the sci­
entific assessment of the probability for harmful consequences from bio­
technology could cost many times more. Once we have invested heavily in 
the expected value analysis (both in money and time) it will be hard to ig­
nore the scientific evidence, even if it is inconclusive and irrelevant. There 
are, in other words, philosophical choices that must be made on the first 
day of inquiry. Investment in the acquisition of facts has policy implica­
tions. In this sense, public policy does not recognize the fact/value distinc­
tion. The research and development choices that are made today must be 
made against a broad, cosmopolitan understanding of the values relevant 
to food safety and quality. It is, perhaps, the public’s confidence in scientif­
ic decision makers to faithfully represent the full tapestry of values that 
will ultimately matter the most. Any tendency to disavow or ignore ques­
tions of responsibility for risk will undercut that confidence, and justifi­
ably so.
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